Abstract-We consider the secure quantum communication over a network with the presence of the malicious adversary who can eavesdrop and contaminate the states. As the main result, when the maximum number m1 of the attacked channels is less than a half of network transmission rate m0 (i.e., m1 < m0/2), our protocol achieves secret and correctable quantum communication of rate m0 −2m1 by asymptotic n uses of the network. Our protocol requires no classical communication and no knowledge of network structure, but instead, a node operation is limited to the application of an invertible matrix to bit basis states. Our protocol can be thought as a generalization of honest-dealer verifiable quantum secret sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding is a coding method, addressed first by Ahlswede et al. [2] , that allows network nodes to manipulate the information packets before forwarding. As a quantum analog, quantum network coding considers sending quantum states through a network which consists of quantum channels and nodes which perform quantum operations. Since quantum network coding was first discussed by Hayashi et al. [6] , many other papers [6] - [11] have studied quantum network codes.
In order for the secure communication over network, the security analysis of network codes is inevitable. The paper [3] started to discuss the secrecy of the classical network code and it was shown that the secrecy is improved by network coding. On the other hand, Jaggi et al. [5] showed that when transmission rate m 0 of network and the maximum rate m 1 of malicious injection satisfy m 1 < m 0 , there exists an asymptotically correctable classical network code with rate m 0 − m 1 by asymptotic n uses of the network. Furthermore, Hayashi et al. [14] extended this result so that the secrecy is also guaranteed: when previously defined m 0 , m 1 and the information leakage rate m 2 satisfy m 1 + m 2 < m 0 , there exists a classical network code of rate m 0 − m 1 − m 2 which is asymptotically secret and correctable by n uses of the network.
The security analysis of quantum network codes was initiated in [15] , [16] . However, the protocol in [15] , [16] only keeps secrecy from the malicious adversary but the correctness of the state is not guaranteed if there is an attack. Moreover, this protocol depends on the network structure and requires classical communication.
In this paper, to resolve these problems and as a natural quantum extension of the secure classical network codes [5] , [14] , we present a quantum network code which is secret and correctable. To take a similar method to [5] , [14] , we transmit a state by n uses of the quantum network. When the network transmission rate is m 0 and the maximum number m 1 of the attacked channels is restricted by m 1 < m 0 /2, our protocol correctly transmits quantum information of rate m 0 − 2m 1 by asymptotic n uses of the network. Since the correctness of the transmitted quantum state guarantees the secrecy of the quantum channel [1] , the secrecy of our protocol is guaranteed.
There are notable properties in our protocol. First, our protocol can be implemented without any classical communication.
We generate the negligible rate secret shared randomness needed for our code by negligible rate use of the quantum communication instead of the classical communication. Secondly, our protocol is secure from any malicious operation on m 1 channels at most as long as m 1 < m 0 /2 holds. That is, when m 1 < m 0 /2, our protocol is safe from the strongest eavesdropper Eve who knows the network structure and the network operations, keeps the classical information extracted from the wiretapped states, and applies the quantum operations on the attacking channels adaptively by her information. Thirdly, our protocol transmits a quantum state without the knowledge of the quantum network structure.
However, unlike [15] , [16] and like [5] , [14] , we place a constraint on our network that a node operation is the application of an invertible matrix to bit basis states.
Our protocol can be thought as a generalization of the honest-dealer verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS) [4] because honest-dealar VQSS corresponds to a special case of our protocol where the network consists of parallel m 0 quantum channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the network structure and Section III formally states two main results of this paper. Based on the preliminaries in Section IV, our code is constructed in Section V. In Section VI, we suggest the transmission protocol with our code and show that the entanglement fidelity is upper bounded by the sum of the bit error probability and the phase error probability. In Section VII, we derive the bit error probability and the phase error probability. In Section VIII, by attaching the secure classical network code presented in [12] to our quantum network protocol, we show that the secure quantum network code without classical communication can be implemented. Section IX explains the correctness implies the secrecy in our protocol. Section X gives the conclusion of this paper.
II. QUANTUM NETWORK AND ATTACK MODEL
We give the formal description of our quantum network structure which is defined as a natural quantum extension of a classical network structure. The information rates related to network transmission and malicious attack are summarized in Table I .
A. Network Structure and Transmission
We consider the network described by a directed acyclic graph G N = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes (vertices) and E is the set of channels (edges). The network G N has one source node which has m 0 outgoing channels and one sink node which has m 0 incoming channels. The nodes, which are not source or sink, are called intermediate nodes and denoted as v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v c where c := |V | − 2 according to the order of the information conversion. An intermediate node t has the same number k t of incoming and outgoing channels where
The transmission on the network G N is described as follows. At time 0, the source node transmits the input information along m 0 outgoing channels. At time t where 1 ≤ t ≤ c, the node v t applies information conversion to the information from k t incoming channels, and outputs conversion outcome along k t outgoing channels. After time c, the sink node receives the output information from the m 0 incoming channels. The details of the transmitted information and information conversion are described in the following subsections.
After the conversion at each time, we assign the numbers 1, . . . , m 0 to the channels keeping the information. At the conversion in the node v t , the assigned numbers of channels are exchanged between k t incoming channels and k t outgoing channels.
B. Classical Network
To explain our model of the quantum network, we consider the classical case. When we use the channel only once, each channel transmits one symbol of the finite field F q . Hence, the information after every time is described by the vector space F m0 q . We assume that the information conversion at each intermediate nodes is invertible linear. That is, the information conversion at intermediate node v t is written as an invertible k t × k t matrix A t acting only on the k t components of the vector space F m0 q . Therefore, combining all the conversions, the relation between the input information x ∈ F m0 q and the output information y ∈ F m0 q can be characterized by an invertible m 0 × m 0 matrix K as y = Kx.
We extend the above discussion to the case of n uses of the network, i.e., each channel has n symbols of F q . We assume that intermediate node v t applies the matrix A t at n times. Maximum number of attacked channels (m 1 < m 0 /2) ma
The number of the attacked channels (ma ≤ m 1 )
When the input (output) information is written as an m 0 × n matrix X (Y ), we have
Next, we discuss the case where Eve attacks m a (≤ m 1 ) channels. Since all the node operations are linear, there is a linear relation between the information on each channel and output information. That is, there are m a vectors w 1 , . . . , w ma in F m0 q satisfying the following condition. When Eve adds the noise z 1 , . . . , z ma ∈ F n q on the m a attacked channels, the relation (1) is changed to
where W = (w 1 , . . . , w ma ) and Z = (z 1 , . . . , z ma ) T . Here, the vectors w 1 , . . . , w ma are determined by the network topology and a linear operation on each node. For the detail, see [16, Section 2.2] . Even when Eve chooses the noise dependently of the input information, the output Y is always written in the form (2) while Z might depend on X. That is, the noise is given by the subspace W C ⊗ F n q , where W C is defined as the subspace spanned by columns of W .
C. Quantum Network
We consider a natural quantum extension of the above classical network. Each single use of quantum channel is given as the quantum system H spanned by {|x b } x∈Fq . In n uses of the network, the whole system to be transmitted is written as
To describe the node operations, we introduce the following unitary operations: For an invertible m × m matrix A and an invertible n × n matrix B, two unitaries L(A) and R(B) are defined as
Node v t converts the information on the subsystem H ⊗kt×n by applying the unitary L(A t ). When there is no attack, the operation of the whole network is the application of the unitary L(K).
Next, to describe the situation that Eve attacks m a (≤ m 1 ) quantum channels in n uses of the network, we introduce the following assumption and notations. We first assume that Eve possesses a large quantum system H W so that all of Eve's operations are written as unitaries. Also, define the set of attacked channels as E A := {e A(1) , . . . , e A(ma) } ⊂ E and the quantum systems possessed by e A(1) , . . . , e A(ma) as H A(1) , . . . , H A(ma) spanned by {|z T b } z∈F n q , respectively. We denote the input nodes of e A(1) , . . . , e A(ma) as nodes v t(1) , . . . , v t(ma) and define O t := {i ∈ {1, . . . , m a }|t(i) = t} for t = 0, . . . , c. Then, H Ot := ⊗ i∈Ot H A(i) denotes the quantum system of channels attacked at time t by the discussion below.
The transmission on our quantum network with m a channel attacks is described by iteration of the following process from time t = 0 to t = c. At time t, after applying node operation L(A t ) on the quantum system H ⊗kt×n of k t incoming channels (no operation if t = 0), the quantum system H ⊗kt×n is sent through outgoing k t channels. Among the k t outgoing channels, |O t | channels (e A(i) with i ∈ O t ) are corrupted by Eve's operation on H Ot ⊗ H W , and then the corrupted systems arrive at the next nodes. After all of k t systems arrive at the next nodes, the process at time t ends.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our code is constructed without any knowledge of the network, i.e., the encoder and the decoder do not know the node operations L(A t ), network operation L(K) nor the topology of the network. In the following, we use the given quantum network n times, i.e., the block-length is n. Main Idea in Our Code: Our quantum code is designed based on the classical network codes in [5] , [14] which correct malicious injection by finding the subspace of injection from the received message and then recovering the original message from the received information not in the injected subspace. In the analysis of our code, we reduce the correctness of our code to that of two classical codes with respect to bit basis and phase basis. In that reduction, our quantum code is sophisticatedly defined so that the two classical codes are similar to the codes in [5] , [14] . A difficult point in this reduction to the classical codes is that the accessible information from the network output state is restricted since measurement disturbs the quantum states, whereas the classical codes [5] , [14] have access to all information of the network output. Our code circumvents this difficulty by attaching to the codeword the ancilla whose measurement outcome contains the sufficient information for finding the subspace of injection. Main Results: First, we present the coding theorem with use of the secret shared randomness of negligible rate. The shared randomness between the encoder and the decoder plays a crucial role in our code. The results are stated with respect to the entanglement fidelity F 2 e (ρ, κ) := x|κ ⊗ ι R (|x x|)|x for a quantum protocol κ and a purification |x of the state ρ. The completely mixed state is denoted as ρ mix . and the attack on the above network is limited to m 1 channels at most. When m 1 < m 0 /2, independently of the form of the invertible matrix K, there exists a quantum network code with the transmission rate m 0 − 2m 1 to satisfy the following conditions. The code requires the secret shared randomness between the sender and receiver only with a negligible rate in comparison with the block-length n. The code implements the quantum transmission κ whose entanglement fidelity F 2 e (ρ mix , κ) satisfies
Notice that this code depends only on the rates m 0 and m 1 , and does not depend on the detail structure of the network. Section V gives the code realizing the performance mentioned in Theorem 3.1. In Sections VI and VII it is proved that the code given in Section V satisfies the performance mentioned in Theorem 3.1.
Indeed, it is known that there exists a classical network code to transmit classical information securely when the number of attacked channels is less than the half of the rate of the transmitted information from the sender to the receiver [12] . Although Theorem 3.1 requires secure transmission of classical information with negligible rate, the result [12] mentioned that such secure transmission can be realized by using the negligible rate of our quantum network with bit basis states. Hence, as shown in Section VIII, the combination of the result [12] and Theorem 3.1 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Quantum Network Code without Classical Communication):
Suppose that the operation of the whole network is the application of the unitary L(K) of an invertible matrix K ∈ F m0×m0 q and the attack on the above network is limited to m 1 channels at most. When m 1 < m 0 /2, independently of the form of the invertible matrix K, there exists a quantum network code with the transmission rate m 0 − 2m 1 which implements the quantum transmission κ whose entanglement fidelity
Connection to Code in [4] : The quantum error-correcting code in [4] approximately corrects arbitrary errors when the number of errors less than a half of the code length. Therefore, if the network consists of parallel m 0 channels (i.e., L(K) is the identity operator), the code in [4] can be applied to our network. However, if L(K) is not the identity, the code in [4] cannot be applied because even one network channel attack might corrupt all m 0 network outputs. In this sense, our code generalizes the result in [4] , but instead we employ the secret shared randomness between the encoder and the decoder. As mentioned above, however, we can share the secret randomness necessary for our code without losing any asympototic rate by attaching the protocol in [12] .
IV. PRELIMINARIES

A. Phase Basis
We discuss the operation on the phase basis {|z p } z∈Fq defined as [13, Section 8.1.2]
where ω := exp 2πi p and tr y := Tr M y (y ∈ F q ) with the multiplication map M y : x → yx identifying the finite field F q with the vector space F 
B. Extended Quantum System in Our Code
In our code, the extended quantum system H ′ , described below, is considered as a unit quantum system of encoding and decoding operations. Dependently of the block-length n, we choose a power q ′ := q α of q to satisfy the condition
where n = n ′ α. We identify the system H ′ := H ⊗α with the system spanned by {|x b } x∈F q ′ . Then, n uses of our quantum network can be regarded as n ′ uses of quantum network over the quantum system H ′ . Similarly to the system H, for invertible matrices
Lemma 4.1 is also satisfied for L ′ (A) and R ′ (B).
C. Notations for Quantum Systems
By n uses of the network, the quantum system
Moreover, for X ∈ {A, B, C} and
The bit or phase basis states are denoted with
D. CSS code in our quantum network code
In our code, we employ CSS code described in this subsection. Define two classical codes
With the above definitions, the code space is given as H
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION WITH NEGLIGIBLE RATE
SECRET SHARED RANDOMNESS Now, we describe the quantum network code with the secret shared randomness of negligible rate. In our code, the encoder and the decoder are determined based on secret random variables SR = (R 2 , V ) and R 0 . These random variables are chosen uniformly and independently satisfying the following conditions. The random variable variable SR is shared between the encoder and the decoder, and R 0 is owned by the encoder. Note that the shared secret random variable SR has negligible rate with respect to n. Depending on the secret random variables SR and R 0 , the encoder E SR,R0 is defined as an isometry quantum channel from 
A. Encoder E SR,R0
We give the encoding operation when the input state is a state |φ ∈ H ′ code .
Encode 1 (Check Bit Embedding) Encode the state |φ with an isometry map U
Encode 2 (Vertical Mixing
With these matrices, define the random matrix R
where I d is the d-dimensional identity matrix. Encode |φ 2 with the unitary map
X| as
Therefore, the encoder E SR,R0 is the isometry map written as
We give the decoding operation when the input state is a state |ψ ∈ H m0×n = H
Decode 1 (Decoding of Encode 3) Construct (R
is the decoder for the encoder
† , the state |ψ is decoded as 
where P W b and P Wp are projections to the subspaces
) and
where the matrix ρ X b ,Xp,|ψ1 and the operator D R2,X b ,Xp are defined as
).
Therefore, the decoder D SR is a TP-CP map written as
Since the size of the shared randomness SR is sublinear with respect to n, we have constructed our code with the shared randomness of negligible rate.
VI. CORRECTABILITY OF OUR CODE
We consider the situation that the authorized sender, Alice, sends quantum information to the authorized receiver, Bob, through the quantum network with the existence of Eve who attacks the network. To keep security from Eve's attack, Alice and Bob communicate with the secure quantum network code introduced in Section V.
Let Γ be the TP-CP map of the given quantum network with malicious attacks. If the encoder and the decoder are defined as the probabilistic mixture by the uniformly chosen random variables SR and R 0 , the entire protocol is written as
The correctability of the transmission is evaluated by the entanglement fidelity F e (ρ mix , κ) for the channel κ with respect to the completely mixed state ρ mix in H ′ code , which is defined by
where
This value is evaluated as
|iī pp iī|, and |ī p is complex conjugate of |i p . Eq. (5) holds from P b P p = |Φ Φ| proved in Lemma B.2.
We show that the first term Tr κ ⊗ ι R (|Φ Φ|)(I − P b ) of (6) is the bit error probability which is defined as the average probability that the bit basis state |M b ∈ H ′ code is sent but the bit measurement outcome on the protocol output is not M . For a bit basis state |M b ∈ H ′ code , we have
Since the entangled state |Φ is a superposition of the bit basis state |ii b , the bit error probability is given as the first term Tr κ ⊗ ι R (|Φ Φ|)(I − P b ) of (6) . Similarly, since the entangled state |Φ is given as the superposition of the phase basis state |iī p (proved in Lemma B.1), the second term Tr κ⊗ ι R (|Φ Φ|)(I − P p ) of (6) is the phase error probability. Therefore, we can bound the entanglement fidelity as
As shown in the next section, the bit and the phase error probabilities are upper bounded by O max
Since q ′ is taken in Section V as n·n ′m 0 q ′m 0 −m 1 → 0 and this implies n/q ′ → 0, the protocol satisfies n(1 − F 2 e (ρ mix , κ)) → 0. Hence, our proof of Theorem 3.1 is completed.
VII. BIT AND PHASE ERROR PROBABILITIES
In this section, we bound separately the bit error probability and the phase error probability. Throughout in this section, we assume m a ≤ m 1 < m 0 /2. For notational convenience, for any integer k and X ∈ F k×n ′ q ′ , we denote
A. Application of the Protocol in Bit Basis
We first calculate the bit error probability. Assume that the input state is a bit basis state |M b ∈ H 
On the other hand, Y is decoded to
′ , the decoding succeeds. We calculate the prob-
is recovered instead of M and the decoding success probability is lower bounded by this probability.
B. Existence of Recovery Map (bit error)
Recall that Im W Z is a subspace of F m0 q (Section II). If we assume
there exists a recovery map which recovers the original message M . That is, from (10), we can define a map D b : 
, the map D b recovers the original message as
Since dim Im R 0 | W b = m 0 − m 1 and rank W Z ≤ m a ≤ m 1 , Eq. (10) holds with probability
′ ) from the following lemma. Lemma 7.1: For integers n 0 ≥ n 1 + n 2 , we fix an n 0 -dimensional space V and an n 1 -dimensional subspace W ⊂ V, and randomly choose an n 2 -dimensional subspace R ⊂ V with the uniform distribition. Then, we have
Proof: The probability Pr[W ∩ R = {0}] is the same as the probability to choose n 2 linearly independent vectors so that they do not intersect with R. Therefore, we have
C. Discoverability of the Recovery Map (bit error)
In this subsection, we calculate the probability that the solution D R2,O b 3,b of (3) coincides with a recovery map. Throughout this subsection, we assume (10) holds, i.e., the recovery map exists.
Since the bit measurement outcome
A , the equation (3) is written as
If it holds that
the columns of KR 0
Therefore, if the equation (13) for any M andĒ 3 , i.e., the bit error is corrected. That is, the bit decoding success probability is bounded as
In the following, we bound the probability (13) when (10) is satisfied, by two steps.
Step 1: First, we give one necessary condition for (13) and calculate the probability that the condition is satisfied. Since it holds that
the following condition is a necessary condition for (13):
The condition (16) holds if and only if
By applying the following Lemma 7.2 to all q ′ rank W Z vectors in {x
q ′ }, the condition (16) holds with probability 1 − q
Proof: Proof is in Appendix C.
Step 2: In this step, we calculate the probability that (13) holds under the assumptions (10) and (16) . We introduce notations with column vectors
and define an index (injective mapping) i : {1, ..., m 0 } → {1, ..., m 0 } so that rank(w i(1) , . . . , w i(m2) ) = rank W Z. Note that the condition (13) holds if m 2 vectors (u i(1) + w i(1) ), . . . , (u i(m2) + w i(m2) ) are linearly independent. The condition (10) guarantees that m 2 vectors (u i(1) + w i(1) ), . . . , (u i(m2) + w i(m2) ) are linearly independent if the following condition (18) holds.
Then, we calculate the probability (18) holds. It follows from the definitions of u 1 , . . . , u m0 , w 1 , . . . , w m0 and index function i that
Therefore, (18) holds only if dim S u = rank W Z which implies (assumptions (10) and (16) are abbreviated)
Applying Lemma 7.1 with (n 0 , W, R) := (m 2 , S w , S u ), we find the relation
Also, we have the following Lemma 7.3.
Therefore, (18) holds with probability at least 1 − O(1/q ′ ) when (10) and (16) are assumed.
To summarize, from the two probabilities derived above two steps, we have
Combining (14) and the inequality above, we have
D. Phase Error Probability
Since coding and node operations are also considered as linear operations in phase basis from Lemma 4.1, we can apply similar analysis to the phase basis errors as bit basis errors in Subsections VII-A, VII-B and VII-C.
Consider the situation that a phase basis state |M p ∈ H ′ code is encoded and transmitted through the quantum network. As we analyzed for bit basis states, we also perform the phase basis measurement first and then apply the decoding process. When ρ receive is received, the phase measurement outcome
By the decoder, Y p is decoded to
If we assume
there exists a recovery map from phase errors. In the same way as Subsection VII-B, we have Pr
] p in (4) to be a recovery map, it needs to be satisfied that
Applying the same discussion in Step 1 of Subsection VII-C to the phase basis, we have
with probability at least 1 − n ′m 0
Proof: Proof is in Appendix C Assuming (19) and (21), the condition (20) holds with probability at least 1 − O(1/q ′ ), in the similar way to Step 2 of Subsection VII-C.
From the probabilities derived above, in the same way as the bit success probability, the phase decoding success probability is derived as
VIII. SECURE QUANTUM NETWORK CODE WITHOUT CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION
In the secure quantum network code given in Theorem 3.1, we assumed that the encoder and the decoder share the negligible rate randomness SR secretly. The secret shared randomness can be realized by secure communication. The paper [12] provided a secure classical communication protocol for the classical network as Proposition 8.1.
Proposition 8.1 ( [12, Theorem 1]):
Let q 1 be the size of the finite field which is the information unit of the network channel. We assume the inequality c 1 + c 2 < c 0 for the classical network code where c 0 is transmission rate from Alice to Bob, c 1 is the rate of noise injected by Eve, and c 2 is the rate of information leakage to Eve. When q 2 := q c0 1 , there exists a k-bit transmission protocol of block-length n 2 := c 0 (c 0 − c 2 + 1)k over F q2 such that
where P err is the error probability and I(M ; E) is the mutual information between the message M ∈ F k 2 and the Eve's information E.
By attaching the protocol in Proposition 8.1 as a quantum protocol, we can share the negligible rate randomness secretly as the following proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Since the protocol of Proposition 8.1 can be implemented with the quantum network by sending bit basis states, the following protocol implements the code satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.2.
Given a block-length n, we choose the prime power q ′ = q α such that α = ⌊ 3 log 2 n log 2 q ⌋ i.e., q ′ /n 3 → 1. Hence, as the implementation of protocol in Theorem 3.1 with the extension field of size q ′ , the sender and the receiver need to share the secret randomness of 4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 ) elements of F q ′ Hence, using the protocol given in Proposition 8.1 with (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) := (m 0 , m 1 , m 1 ), the sender secretly sends the receiver k := ⌈(4m 0 + 2m 0 (m 0 − m 1 )) log 2 q ′ ⌉ bits, which is called the preparation protocol. To guarantee that the error of the preparation protocol goes to zero, we choose the other prime power q 2 = q α2 such that α 2 = ⌊ 2 log 2 log 2 n log 2 q ⌋ i.e., q 2 /(log n)
(log 2 n) 2 ) → 0. Also, the preparation protocol requires the transmission of n 2 = m 0 (m 0 − m 1 + 1)kα 2 elements of F q . That is, n 2 is evaluated as
Then, we define n 1 := n − n 2 , which implies n 1 /n → 1. Finally, we apply the protocol given in Theorem 3.1 with n = n 1 , n ′ := n 1 /α, and the above chosen α and q ′ . Since the relation n 1 /n → 1 guarantees the condition 
IX. SECRECY OF OUR CODE
We mention that the condition n(1 − F 2 e (ρ mix , κ)) → 0 in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 guarantees the secrecy of the protocol. The leaked information of a quantum protocol κ is upper bounded by entropy exchange H e (ρ, κ) := H(κ ⊗ ι R (|x x|)) = H(κ E (ρ)) as follows, where |x is a purification of the state ρ and κ E is the channel to the environment. When the input state ρ x is generated subject to the distribution p x , the mutual information between the input system and the environment is given as H(κ E ( x p x ρ x )) − x p x H(κ E (ρ x )), which is upper bounded by H e (κ, x p x ρ x ). By entanglement fidelity, the entropy exchange is upper bounded as [1] 
where h(p) is the binary entropy defined as h(p) := p log p + (1 − p) log(1 − p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and d is the dimension of the input space of κ. Hence, when the mixture distribution is the completely mixed state ρ mix , because d = dim H code = O q (m0−2m1)n in our protocol, the condition n(1 − F 2 e (ρ mix , κ)) → 0 leads that entropy exchange of the protocol is asymptotically 0, i.e., there is no leakage in the protocol. Thus, the asymptotic correctability n(1 − F 2 e (ρ mix , κ)) → 0 also guarantees the secrecy of the protocol in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented an asymptotically secret and correctable quantum network code as a quantum extension of the classical network codes given in [5] , [14] . Under multiple uses of the network and the restriction to node operations, our code acheives rate m 0 − 2m 1 asymptotically without any classical communication. Our code needs secret shared randomness and it is implemented by attaching a known classical secret transmission protocol [12] in our quantum network code. In the analysis of the code, we only considered the correctability because the secrecy is guaranteed by the correctness of the recovered state. The correctability is derived analogously to the classical codes [5] , [14] by evaluating bit and phase error probabilities separately. 
When x, y are considered as column vectors, for A ∈ F m×m q , it holds that (Ax, y) = (x, A T y). When x, y are considered as row vectors, for A ∈ F m×m q , it holds that (xA, y) = (x, yA T ).
Consider F n q as an n-dimensional row vector space over F q , For R(B 1 ) := x∈F n q |xB bb x| and z ∈ F n q ,
APPENDIX B PROOF OF (5) In this section, we show Lemmas B.1 and B.2 which shows the relationships between two maxially entangled states and projections P b , P p for the bit and the phase bases. For generality, we consider the quantum system where the bit basis is {|x b } x∈F d q . We define the following maxially entangled states with respect to the bit and phase bases:
We use the inner product defined in (24) for the proofs. Lemma B.1:
Proof:
Eq. (25) holds because
Proof: 
